A situation in which a finite set of agents can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. In the literature, various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found, in which only certain subsets of the agent set are allowed to form. In this article, we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under intersection, i.e., for any two feasible coalitions, their intersection is also feasible. Such set systems, called intersection closed systems, are a generalization of the convex geometries. We use the concept of closure operator for intersection closed systems and we define the restricted TU-game taking into account the limited possibilities of cooperation determined by the intersection closed system. Next, we study the properties of this restricted TU-game. Finally, we introduce and axiomatically characterize a family of allocation rules for games TU-games on intersection closed systems, which contains a natural extension of the Shapley value.
Introduction
In its classical interpretation, a cooperative TU-game describes a situation in which the members of each coalition can cooperate to form a feasible coalition and earn its worth. Cooperative games on set systems are cooperative games in which the agents have restricted cooperation possibilities, which are defined by a set system. The first model in which the restrictions are defined by the connected subgraphs of a graph is due to Myerson (1977) . Since then, many other set systems have been used to model restricted cooperation: Algaba et al. (2000 Algaba et al. ( , 2001 ) study cooperative games on union stable systems, Algaba et al. (2004) consider TU-games on antimatroids, Bilbao (1998) and Bilbao and Edelman (2000) introduce TU-games on convex geometries, Bilbao (2003) studies TUgames on augmenting set systems, and Lange and Grabisch (2009) The purpose of this article is to study TU-games on intersection closed systems. A set system is intersection closed if the intersection of two feasible coalitions is still feasible. Every convex geometry is intersection closed, but an intersection closed system is not necessarily a convex geometry. To the best of our knowledge, is the unique work involving intersection closed systems. They focus on set-valued solution concepts while we investigate (single-valued) allocation rules. Section 2 is a preliminary section in which we consider a new basis for the set of TUgames. In most cases, the basis of upper TU-games, also called unanimity TU-games, is used to analyze cooperative games on set systems. Here, the lower TU-games prove much more appealing. Section 3 presents TU-games on intersection closed systems. Section 4 introduces the restricted TU-games on intersection closed systems through a closure operator. We determine the image and the kernel of its operator. In particular, we provide a basis for the image of this operator in terms of lower games and a basis for the kernel of this operator in terms of Dirac TU-games. We then provide a formula to compute the coordinates of the restricted TU-games in the basis of lower TU-games. We also derive an expression of the closure operator in the basis of lower TU-games. Section 5 provides an axiomatic study of allocation rules for TU-games on intersection closed systems. We focus on allocation rules that are obtained by applying to the restricted TU-games an allocation rule for classical TU-games. An instance of such allocation rules is the allocation rule defined as the Shapley value (1953) on the restricted TU-game. We call it the Intersection rule. We combine three types of axioms. Some axioms describe the effect of the intersection closed system on the allocation rule. Some axioms describe the impact of the coalition function on the allocation rule. Finally, we invoke an axiom of consistency, which is specific to the targeted allocation rule. The first axiomatic result is a characterization of the Intersection rule that can be considered as close as possible to the classical characterization of the Shapley value. The second axiomatic result characterizes any allocation rule obtained by applying to the restricted TU-games an efficient and additive allocation rule for classical TU-games. As a particular case, we thus obtain a second characterization of the Intersection rule. These results exploit the properties found in section 4.
Preliminaries
For each finite set of elements S, the letter s denotes the cardinality of S. For a set S and i ∈ S, we use the notation S \ i instead of S \ {i}. In the same way, S ∪ i stands for S ∪ {i}. We use the notation ⊆ to denote weak set inclusion and ⊂ to denote proper set inclusion. For a poset (P, ≤) and x, y ∈ P such that x ≤ y, [x, y] denotes the set of elements z ∈ P such that x ≤ z ≤ y. Given a finite poset, consider a linear extension of P and define the p × p upper triangular matrix ζ by ζ(x, y) = 1 if x ≤ y and 0 otherwise.
Since ζ(x, x) = 1 for each x ∈ P , ζ has an inverse, say µ, called the Möbius function. In particular, if P is the collection 2 N of all subsets of a finite set N and is endowed with set inclusion, µ(S, T ) = (−1) t−s for S ⊆ T . Moreover, if g : (P, ≤) −→ R and f : (P, ≤) −→ R are two functions on a finite poset (P, ≤) such that g(x) = y≥x f (y), then f (x) = y≥x g(y)µ(x, y). This operation is known as the Möbius inversion formula.
A situation in which a finite set of agents can obtain certain payoffs by cooperating can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ∈ N agents and v : 2 N −→ R is a coalition function on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ∈ 2 N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the total payoff v(S) that the members of coalition S can obtain by agreeing to cooperate. Since we take the agent set N to be fixed, we denote the game (N, v) by its coalition function v. We denote the collection of all coalition functions on N by G N . The null TU-game 0 G N is the TU-game such that, for each S ∈ 2 N , 0 G N (S) = 0. For each coalition S ∈ 2 N \ ∅, define the Dirac game 1 S as 1 S (T ) = 1 if T = S, and 1 S (T ) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, the collection 1 S : S ∈ 2 N \ ∅ of Dirac games forms a basis for G N . It is often more convenient to use an alternative basis. To this end, for each S ∈ 2 N \∅, define the lower game S as S (T ) = 1 if T ⊆ S and T = ∅, and S (T ) = 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1
The collection S : S ∈ 2 N \ ∅ of lower games is a basis for the linear space of all TU-games.
Proof. It is well-known that G N can be viewed as (2 n − 1)-dimensional linear space. Let S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S 2 n −1 be a fixed sequence of all non-empty coalitions such that n = s 1 ≥ s 2 ≥ . . . ≥ s 2 n −1 = 1. Further, let A = [a ij ] be the (2 n − 1) × (2 n − 1) matrix defined as a ij = S i (S j ) for each i and each j taken in {1, 2, . . . , 2 n − 1}. By definition of the lower games, it follows that A is an upper triangular matrix such that, for each i ∈ N , a ii = 1. Hence, the determinant of A is equal to 1. This implies that S : S ∈ 2 N \ ∅ constitutes a set of (2 n − 1) independent TU-games in the linear space G N , and thus a basis for G N .
From Lemma 1, we deduce that for each v ∈ G N , there exist 2 n − 1 real numbers ν v S , S ⊆ N , S = ∅, uniquely determined, such that:
The numbers ν v S are the coordinates of the game v with respect to the basis of lower games. Thus for each coalition T , we have
Using the Möbius inversion formula for (2 N , ⊇) we get:
3 A payoff vector for a game is a vector x ∈ R n assigning a payoff x i to each agent i ∈ N . An allocation rule Φ is a function that assigns to any v ∈ G N a unique payoff vector Φ(v) ∈ R n . The most well-known allocation rule for G N is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) denoted by Sh and defined as:
Cooperative games on intersection closed systems
A set system is a pair (N, Ω) where N represents a finite set of agents of N, and Ω ⊆ 2 N is a collection of feasible coalitions. A set system (N, Ω), ordered by set inclusion, is an intersection closed system if:
If, moreover, N ∈ Ω, then (N, Ω) forms a complete lattice of sets where:
Throughout this article, we assume that the grand coalition N is feasible so that, for a fixed set of agents N , Ω = {∅, N } is the smallest intersection closed system and Ω = 2 N is the largest one. Let C N be the collection of all such intersection closed systems on 2 N . In case the empty set may not belong to a set system, an intersection closed system is sometimes called closure space or closure system, Moore family, intersection ring (of sets), protopology, topped intersection structure, intersection semilattice (see Caspard and Monjardet, 2003 ).
An example of intersection closed system is pictured in Figure 1 . A well-known instance of an intersection closed system is a convex geometry (Edelman, Jamison, 1985) . A convex geometry is an intersection closed system which satisfies the following extension property:
3. For each S ∈ Ω such that S = N , there exists i ∈ N \S such that S ∪ i ∈ Ω. The intersection closed system in Figure 1 is not a convex geometry: {3, 4} ∈ Ω but there is no i ∈ {1, 2, 5} such that {3, 4} ∪ i ∈ Ω. It can be checked that this intersection closed system is neither an antimatroid, nor a union closed system, nor an accessible union stable system, nor an augmenting system and nor a regular system. Below we point out three relevant examples of intersection closed systems that are not convex geometries.
Example 1 (Matchings) Let M and W be two disjoint sets of agents of equal size such that N = M ∪ W . A matching is a bijective map µ : M −→ W . Given a matching µ, define the set system (N, Ω µ ) as:
In words, S ∈ Ω µ if each agent in M ∩ S has his or her partner in S and each agent M ∩ S has his or her partner in S. The set system (N, Ω µ ) is intersection closed but does not satisfies the extension property since for each S ∈ Ω µ and each
Example 2 (Forests) An undirected graph (or graph) (N, L) is given by a set N of nodes (the agents) and a set L of pairs of nodes, i.e. L ⊆ {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N, i = j}, these pairs being called edges. A path of (N, L) is a finite sequence (i 0 , i 1 , ..., i p ) of nodes such that for 0 ≤ k < p, {i k , i k+1 } ∈ L and, for 0 < k < p, i k−1 = i k+1 . Two nodes i, j are connected in (N, L) if there exists a path (N, L) between i and j, and the graph (N, L) is connected if any two nodes are connected. The subgraph of (N, L) induced by a nonempty coalition of nodes S ∈ 2 N is the graph (S, L(S)) with L(S) = {{i, j} ∈ L : i, j ∈ S}. A graph is cycle-free if there is at most one path connecting any pair of nodes. A coalition of nodes S is connected if (S, L(S)) is connected. By convention, ∅ is connected. Let Ω L denote the set of all connected coalitions in (N, L), which are the relevant coalitions in Myerson (1977)'s model. If (N, L) is a cycle-free graph, then (N, Ω L ) is an intersection closed system, but it is a convex geometry only if (N, L) is also connected.
Example 3 (Permission structures)
The transitive closure of P is denoted byP , and the members ofP −1 (i) are called the superiors of i. In the conjunctive approach developed by Gilles et al. (1992) , a coalition of agents can form only if all superiors of each coalition's member also belong to the coalition. 1 Formally, a coalition S is called autonomous if ∪ i∈SP −1 (i) ⊆ S. It is well-known from Gilles et al. (1992, Proposition 3.2) that the set system (N, Ω P ) where Ω P is the set of autonomous coalitions of the permission structure P is an intersection closed system (and is also union closed). But, (N, Ω P ) is not always a convex geometry. As an example, set N = {1, 2, 3}, P (1) = {3}, P (2) = {3} and P (3) = ∅. Then, Ω P = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2, 3}} and (N, Ω P ) violates the extension property.
In a TU-game v ∈ G N , any subset S ⊆ N is assumed to be able to form a coalition and earn the worth v(S). However, in most applications not every set of participants can form a feasible coalition. Therefore, cooperative game theory models have been developed that take into account restrictions on coalition formation. This can be modeled by considering a set of feasible coalitions Ω ⊆ 2 N that needs not contain all subsets of the agents set N .
Formally, a TU-game on an intersection closed system is a pair (v, Ω) where v is TUgame in G N and Ω in C N is an intersection closed system representing the set of feasible coalitions.
An allocation rule for TU-games on intersection closed systems is a function Φ :
The possible gains from cooperation as modeled by v ∈ G N and the restrictions on cooperation reflected by the intersection closed system Ω are incorporated in an Ω-restricted game (N, v Ω ). To introduce the Ω-restricted game, we need the following definition. Given Ω ∈ C N , define the operator c on 2 N that assigns to each coalition S ∈ 2 N the coalition c(S) defined as:
Since Ω is a finite lattice of sets, c(S) is well-defined and corresponds to the smallest feasible coalition that contains S. For each S ∈ 2 N and each T ∈ 2 N , we can easily verify that the following properties hold:
From points 1-3, we conclude that the operator c is a closure operator. It follows that a coalition S ∈ 2 N is feasible if and only if c(S) = S. Note also that:
Given a pair (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N , we define the Ω-restricted game v Ω ∈ G N of (v, Ω) as:
i.e. v Ω assigns to each coalition the worth of its closure, so that, for S ∈ Ω, v Ω (S) = v(S) for each coalition S ∈ Ω.
Analysis
Fix an intersection closed system Ω ∈ C N . In this section, we address the properties of the mapping
Define the subspaces G N,Ω and G N,Ω of G N as:
Proposition 1 The mapping L Ω is the projection of G N on the subspace G N,Ω along the direction of G N,Ω . Furthermore, the sub-collection of lower TU-games
forms a basis for G N,Ω , and the sub-collection of Dirac TU-games
It follows that B Ω ∪ 1 Ω is a collection of (ω − 1) + (2 n − ω) = 2 n − 1 linearly independent elements of G N (recall that, by Lemma 1, the lower TU-games are linearly independent, and any sub-collection of distinct Dirac TU-games are also linearly independent). Therefore B Ω ∪ 1 Ω is a basis for G N , such that,
Given a coalition S ∈ 2 N , let max Ω S be the set of maximal sub-coalitions Q of S belonging to Ω. Note that max Ω S is non-empty since S contains the feasible set ∅. Given a non-empty collection of coalitions Θ chosen in max Ω S, Q Θ denotes the intersection of coalitions belonging to Θ, and θ stands for the number of elements of Θ. In the following, ∅ stands for the null game 0 G N . Proposition 2 expresses each restricted lower TU-game either as a linear combination of lower games or as the supremum of lower games.
Proposition 2 For each lower TU-game S , S ∈ 2 N \ ∅, it holds that:
In particular, if S ∈ Ω, then Ω S = S .
Proof. Pick any coalition S ∈ 2 N \ ∅ and consider the lower TU-game S ∈ G N and its projection Ω S ∈ G N,Ω . We first prove the first equality in (4) . To this end, consider any coalition T ∈ 2 N \ ∅. We distinguish two cases:
(a) If max Ω S = {∅}, then the right-hand side of the first equality in (4) reduces to the null game. Moreover, c(T ) is not included in S, which implies that Ω S (T ) = S (c(T )) = 0. Thus, both sides of the first equality are equal to zero. 
Keeping in mind that for each non-empty finite set S, T ⊆S (−1) t = 0, we deduce that ∅⊂Θ⊆∆ T S (−1) θ−1 = 1, as desired.
(b2.2) In case there is no Q ∈ max Ω S such that T ⊆ Q, then, for each subset Θ of max Ω S, Q Θ (T ) = 0. Moreover, S does not contain c(T ) and so Ω S (T ) = S (c(T )) = 0, as desired.
In the particular case when S ∈ Ω, then max Ω S = {S} and the right-hand side of the first equality in (4) reduces to S .
It remains to prove that Ω S = sup Q∈max Ω S Q in equality in (4) . It suffices to note that, for each T ∈ 2 N \ ∅, c(T ) ⊆ S if and only if there is Q ∈ max Ω S such that Q ⊇ T . It follows that
Proposition 3 Let (v, Ω) be a game with restricted cooperation and let v Ω ∈ G N,Ω be the associated Ω-restricted game given by:
Then, for each S ∈ Ω \ ∅, it holds that:
Proof.
From equality (2), we have:
The above expression can be decomposed as follows:
. Thus, we obtain:
showing the result. 
To understand this coincidence, notice that each T ∈ Ω can be such that either T = Q Θ for different sets Θ ⊆ max Ω S or for none of them.
The next result provides an expression of the linear operator L Ω in the basis of lower TU-games.
Theorem 1 Let (v, Ω) be a game with restricted cooperation in G N × C N . The coordinates of v Ω with respect to the basis of lower games are given by:
Proof. The mapping which associates to each coalition function v ∈ G N the coordinates ν v Ω S , S ∈ Ω \ ∅ is linear. Because the collection { H : H ∈ 2 N \ ∅} is a basis for G N , it suffices to prove the above equality for any lower game H . Obviously, we have ν H T = 1 for H = T , and ν H T = 0 otherwise. So, consider any H , H ∈ 2 N \ ∅, and any S ∈ Ω \ ∅. Two cases arise: (a) For H ⊇ S, we have:
where the last equality comes from (5) and Remark 1. Thus, in both cases, we have the desired result.
The Intersection rule
There exist two main approaches to define a Shapley for TU-games on set systems. In the first approach, the Shapley value consists in considering equally likely compatible orderings of agents. An ordering is compatible with a set system (N, Ω) if it corresponds to a maximal chain of Ω, that is, an ordered sequence of feasible coalitions ∅ ⊂ · · · S t ⊂ S t+1 · · · ⊂ N , where S t+1 \ S t contains exactly one element for each t. For each compatible ordering, the agents enter a bargaining room one by one, and upon entering each agent is paid his marginal contribution, and the Shapley value of (v, Ω) is the average, over all such compatible orderings, of the marginal contribution vectors. This is the approach chosen, for instance, by Bilbao (1998) and Bilbao and Edelman (2000) , to define and axiomatize a Shapley value on convex geometries. In case the set system does not contain a compatible ordering of agents, which may be the case for intersection closed systems, this approach is not very compelling. That is the reason why the second approach defines the Shapley value for TU-games on a set system as the Shapley value of a restricted TU-game. This approach is followed, for instance, by van den Brink et al. (2011) who define a Shapley value for union closed systems. A set system (N, Ω) is union closed if:
The Union rule for TU-games on union closed systems is defined as:
The Ω-restricted game v Ω is as follows:
where int(S) stands for the interior of S defined as the largest feasible coalition contained in S.
In this spirit, we introduce and axiomatize an allocation rule for TU-games on intersection closed systems. This allocation rule applies the Shapley value to the Ω-restricted game. Formally the Intersection rule, denoted by I, is defined as:
We present several axioms that can be satisfied by allocation rules Φ on G N × C N . The first two axioms are straightforward generalizations of the well-known Efficiency and 11 Additivity axioms for G N .
Efficiency. For each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N , it holds that:
The next axiom states that in a TU-game on an intersection closed system where the worth of each feasible coalition is null, then agents receive identical payoffs.
We can prove the following preliminary result, which characterizes the structure of an allocation rule satisfying Efficiency, Additivity and Equality.
Proposition 4
If an allocation rule Φ on G N × C N satisfies Efficiency, Additivity and Equality, then, for each
Proof. Consider any allocation rule Φ satisfying Efficiency, Additivity and Equality. Pick any (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N , and consider the TU-game v − v Ω . We have, v − v Ω ∈ G N,Ω and, in particular, (v − v Ω )(N ) = 0. By Efficiency and Equality, we obtain:
On the other hand, since v = v − v Ω + v Ω , by Additivity, we have:
Applying (7), we get:
as desired.
In order to single out specific allocation rules, we introduce two axioms relying on TUgames in which the worth of any coalition equals the worth of its closure. In a TU-game v ∈ G N , two agents i and j are equal if, for each S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j). It is well-known that the Shapley value on G N treats equally equal agents. The Intersection rule I does not satisfies this axiom on G N × C N . However, it satisfies the weaker axiom requiring the same payoff for equal agents in TU-games where the worth of any coalition equals the worth of its closure.
Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems. For each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N where v ∈ G N,Ω , and for each pair of equal agents in v, it holds that:
Similarly as before, the Shapley value assigns a null payoff to null agents on G N . This is not the case of the Intersection rule, unless the domain is restricted to TU-games where the worth of any coalition equals the worth of its closure.
Null agent for intersection closed systems. For each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N where v ∈ G N,Ω , and for each null agent in v, it holds that:
Theorem 2 The allocation rule I on G N × C N is the unique allocation which satisfies Efficiency, Additivity, Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems, Null agent for intersection closed systems and Equality.
Proof. (Uniqueness) Consider any allocation rule Φ satisfying Efficiency, Additivity, Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems, Null agent for intersection closed systems and Equality. We have to show that Φ is uniquely determined on G N ×C N . Consider any (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N . By Proposition 4, we know that Φ(v, Ω) = Φ(v Ω , Ω). By Lemma 1, we know that v Ω admits the following linear decomposition:
where the coordinates ν v Ω S , S ∈ Ω, are uniquely determined. Thus, by Additivity,
It remains to show that, for each S ∈ Ω, Φ(ν v Ω S S , Ω) is uniquely determined. By Proposition 2, for each constant b ∈ R and each S ∈ Ω, we know that b S ∈ G N,Ω . Now, for S = N , since all agents are equal in b N , Efficiency and Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems yield
Next, for each S ∈ Ω\N , define the game v S ∈ G N as
and note that v S (N ) = −ν v Ω S . Since G N,Ω is a vector space, v S ∈ G (N,Ω) . Moreover, it is easy to check that the agents in S are null in v S and that the agents in N \ S are equal in v S . Thus, an application of Null agent for intersection closed systems yields that Φ i (v S , Ω) = 0 for each i ∈ S. In addition, by Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems and Efficiency, we obtain that
This completes the proof of uniqueness.
(Existence) We show that the Intersection rule satisfies all axioms in the statement of Theorem 2. Additivity and Efficiency. The allocation rule I inherits these axioms from the Shapley value and the fact that L Ω is a linear operator such that
Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems. Consider any situation (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N such that v ∈ G N,Ω . Therefore, we have:
The fact that I satisfies Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems follows from the fact that Sh satisfies Equal treatment of equal agents on G N . Null agent for intersection closed systems. Consider any situation (v, Ω) ∈ G N ×C N such that v ∈ G N,Ω . Therefore, we have:
The fact that I satisfies Null agent for intersection closed systems follows from the fact that Sh satisfies Null agents on G N . Equality Consider any situation (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N such that v ∈ G N,Ω . Then, the Ωrestricted game v Ω coincides with the null game 0 G N . Therefore,
where the last equality follows from the additivity of Sh. We conclude that I satisfies Equality.
Logical independence of the axioms.
• The null allocation rule satisfies all axioms except Efficiency.
• The equal division value ED, which assigns to each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N and each i ∈ N the payoff ED i (v, Ω) = v(N )/n satisfies all axioms except Null agent for intersection closed systems. • For a given permutation π on N , denote by S π i the agents preceding i in π. The allocation rule Φ which assigns to each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N and each i ∈ N the payoff Φ i (v, Ω) = v Ω (S π i ∪{i})−v Ω (S π i ) satisfies all axioms except Equal treatment of equal agents for intersection closed systems.
• The allocation rule Φ such that Φ(v, Ω) = Sh(v) satisfies all axioms except Equality.
In addition to this first characterization result, which is as close as possible to the classical axiomatization of the Shapley value, it is possible to provide a second characterization of the Intersection rule as a corollary of a more general result. More specifically, the principle behind the Intersection rule can be extended to any allocation rule f for classical TU-games, and not only to the Shapley value. So, for any allocation rule f on G N , we can construct the allocation rule Φ f on G N × C N such that
Obviously, Φ Sh = I. Our second axiomatic result characterizes a family of allocation rules Φ f . As in Theorem 2, the axioms of Efficiency, Additivity and Equality are invoked in addition to two new axioms.
The first axiom also considers a TU-game where the worth of any coalition equals the worth of its closure. As soon as the allocation rule depends on an exogenous structure, it is natural to wonder about structural changes that preserve the payoff allocation. The axiom below belongs to this category. It states that if a modification in the intersection closed system has no impact on the worth of all coalitions, then the resulting allocation should not change. Observe that the case Ω ⊂ Ω is possible. In this situation, the axiom specifies how an intersection closed system can be augmented without changing the payoff allocation.
The final axiom imposes that if the intersection closed system is complete, then the allocation rule on games on intersection closed systems should coincides with an allocation rule on classical TU-games. The rationale behind this axiom is the aim to extend an allocation rule on classical TU-games to the richer class of games on intersection closed systems.
f -consistency. For a given allocation rule f on G N , it holds that In particular, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2
The Intersection rule I is the unique allocation rule on G N × C N satisfying Efficiency, Additivity, Equality, Sh-consistency and Invariance from irrelevant changes in intersection closed systems.
Proof. (Theorem 3)
Suppose that there is an allocation rule Φ on G N × C N that satisfies Efficiency, Additivity, Equality, f -consistency and Invariance from irrelevant changes in intersection closed systems. We start by showing that f must satisfy Efficiency and Additivity on G N . For each v ∈ G N , Efficiency and f -consistency imply
proving that f also satisfies Efficiency on G N . Similarly, for each (v, u) ∈ G N × G N , Additivity and f -consistency implies that
proving that f also satisfies Additivity. Hence, if f violates either Efficiency or Additivity on G N , then there is no allocation rule Φ on G N × C N that satisfies Efficiency, Additivity, Equality, f -consistency and Invariance from irrelevant changes in intersection closed systems.
Next, let us show that if f satisfies Efficiency and Additivity, then there is a unique allocation rule Φ on G N × C N that satisfies Efficiency, Additivity, Equality, f -consistency and Invariance from irrelevant changes in intersection closed systems. (Uniqueness) As in the proof of Theorem 2, we build on Proposition 4 and Lemma 1 in order to write that
for each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N . By Additivity, it is enough to prove that Φ(ν v Ω S S , Ω) is uniquely determined for each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N and each S ∈ Ω. Since ν v Ω S S ∈ G N,Ω , for each T ∈ 2 N , it holds that Logical independence of the axioms. In what follows, f is an allocation rule on G N that satisfies Efficiency and Additivity, and which differs from the allocation rule f appearing in the axiom of f -consistency, which satisfies Efficiency and Additivity too.
• The allocation rule Φ such that, for each i ∈ N ,
satisfies all axioms except Efficiency.
• The allocation rule Φ such that, for each i ∈ N , Φ i (v, Ω) = f (v Ω ) if v ∈ G N,Ω and Φ i (v, Ω) = f (v Ω ) otherwise satisfies all axioms Additivity.
• The allocation rule Φ such that Φ(v, Ω) = f (v) for each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N satisfies all axioms except Equality.
• The allocation rule Φ such that Φ(v, Ω) = f (v Ω ) for each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N satisfies all axioms except f -consistency.
• From each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N , construct the game z v,Ω ∈ G N such that, for each S ∈ 2 N , z v,Ω (S) = v(S) × |Ω|/2 n if |S| = 1 and z v,Ω(S) = v(S) otherwise. The allocation rule Φ which assigns to each (v, Ω) ∈ G N × C N the payoffs Φ(v, Ω) = f ((z v,Ω ) Ω ) satisfies all axioms except Invariance from irrelevant changes in intersection closed systems.
Conclusion
We would like to conclude this article by pointing out that the axiom system invoked in Theorem 3 has the potential to be applicable to other set systems than the intersection closed systems. Similarly, our axiomatic results might be adapted to other specification of the restricted TU-game obtained from an intersection closed system. Finally, it might be interesting to design an allocation rule specifically for our framework, that is, not extending an allocation rule from classical TU-games to TU-games on intersection closed systems. These lines of research are left for future work.
